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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: NOTICE REQUIREMENTS 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined that (1) previous case law and the NRS require an HOA that is 
seeking to foreclose a superpriority lien to send the holder of a recorded first deed of trust a notice 
of default and notice of sale, even when they have not been formally requested.2 Additionally, they 
held that (2) the district court would have to decide questions of fact to determine whether 
Resources Group was a bona fide purchaser. 
 
Background 
  
 A homeowner/borrower defaulted on his Home Owner Association (“HOA”) dues. As a 
result, the HOA initiated lien foreclosure proceedings under NRS Chapter 116.3 Alessi and 
Koenig, agents for the HOA, gave the homeowner proper notice of default and notice of sale, 
however, they failed to provide the same notice to the U.S. Bank. The notice of default was sent 
to an unaffiliated entity due to a clerical error and, though records suggest the HOA agents mailed 
the notice of sale to the correct address, the U.S. Bank’s files do not show that it received that 
document either. The HOA agents set the lien foreclosure sale to occur thirty-three days after it 
recorded the notice of sale. When no one attended the sale, the agents continued it for the duration 
of sixty days. When neither the homeowner nor U.S. Bank attended the rescheduled sale, the 
property was sold to Resources Group, LLC’s principal, Iyad Eddie Haddad, for $5,331. This was 
approximated to be between ten and fifteen percent of the property’s fair market value. Mr. Haddad 
initially took the title in the name of a trust he had created but later transferred the property to 
Resources Group, LLC.  
  
 Once the homeowner passed away, his estate defaulted on a loan that the U.S. Bank deed 
of trust secured. The U.S. bank then commenced judicial foreclosure proceedings against the estate 
several months after the HOA foreclosure sale. Upon discovery of the HOA sale, the bank added 
Resources Group as a defendant. Resources Group, in response, counterclaimed for a judgment 
quieting title in itself reasoning that, in addition to the attempted notice, Mrs. Haddad was a bona 
fide purchaser of the property. The district court held a bench trial and ruled in favor of Resources 
Group reasoning that U.S. Bank did not have an entitlement to notice because it did not request it. 
Additionally, they found that the HOA agents gave adequate notice despite it not reaching the 
banking institution.  
 
 
 
 
1  By Christopher Gonzalez. 
2  See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 107.090(3)(b) (2015); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3116(2)(b) (2015); Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§ 116.31162(1)(c) (2015); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.311635 (2015). See also SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, 
N.A., 130 Nev. 742, 745, 334 P.3d 408, 411 (2014). 
3  It is noted that the NRS 116 references are the pre-2015 version of those statutes, which are applicable to this 
specific dispute.  
Discussion 
 
 U.S. Bank urged the Court to invalidate the HOA foreclosure sale because the agents that 
conducted it did not provide notice as required under NRS 116.31168 and NRS 107.090.  In 
addition, they argue that the lack of notice renders the sale void or voidable.4 The Court reviewed 
the district court’s legal conclusions de novo but gave deference to the factual findings provided 
that they were supported by substantial evidence or not clearly erroneous. 
 
 This Court referenced recent case law that was decided after the district court’s decision 
and the NRS to restate that the statutory protections that applies to home owners also extends to a 
first deed of trust holder such as the U.S. Bank.5 This provides protection for those who fail to 
request the notices of default and of sale from the HOA organization much like the appealing party 
in this case. Therefore, this Court determined that the district court erred when it ruled that U.S 
Bank was not entitled to notice of default based off the reasoning that it had not requested it. 
 
 The court considered how recent case law failed to address instances where notice was 
attempted and had failed. Without a formal notice, a foreclosing HOA is presented with the 
difficulty of determining which address they should send the notice to. In this case, the U.S. Bank 
did not file a request for notice, however, the publicly recorded deed of trust stated that any 
required notice “shall be given by delivering it or mailing it by first class mail to the appropriate 
party’s address on page 1.” Despite being given instruction on the deed of trust, the HOA agents 
did not follow them and mailed the notice of default to a “return to” name appearing on the same 
deed of trust. The U.S. Bank provided evidence that they were not affiliated with the “return to” 
entity nor were the notice of default documents subsequently forwarded to them. As a result, the 
court found that the District Court “clearly erred” when it determined that the U.S. Bank was given 
adequate notice of default.  
 
This finding was supported by the fact that the HOA agents had a title report that identified 
U.S. Bank as the deed of trust beneficiary and they later mailed the notice of sale to the address 
listed for it on page one of the deed of the trust. In turn, the court found that the failure to mail the 
notice of default at the address given was in violation of NRS. 116.31168 and NRS 107.090(3).6 
The court distinguished this from West Sunset 2050 Trust and Schleining by finding that, despite 
statutory notice deficiencies, the parties complaining about prejudice and the defective notice IN  
those cases had actual notice of the foreclosure proceedings before the sale occurred. 7 Without 
receiving notice from other source, failing to mail the required notice of default deprives the 
property owner of the statutory grace period allotted to cure, compromise, or contest the default. 
This court referenced testimony by a U.S. Bank’s collection officer that stated the loan secured by 
the deed of trust included a future advances clause that, in light of a notice of default, it would 
have paid off the lien and charged the borrower. Without such action from the bank, the court 
suggested that the testimony, if credited, establishes the lack of notice and prejudice needed to 
 
4  See Golden v. Tomiyasu, 79 Nev. 503, 387 P.2d 989 (1963); Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. Chicago Title 
Insurance Co., 97 Nev. 523, 634 P.2d 1216 (1981). 
5  See supra note 2. 
6  Id. 
7  See Schleining v. Cap One, Inc., 326 P.3d 4, 8—9 (2014); West Sunset 2050 Trust v. Nationstar Mortgage, 420 
P.3d 1032, 1035 (2018). 
void the sale. The Court stated that no finding on actual notice or prejudice was made because of 
the erroneous finding that the statutory notice of default was either unnecessary or acceptable.  
 
The Court restates that the HOA agent’s actions did not comply with the statutory 
requirement that it was to serve the U.S. Bank with notice of default, and U.S. bank may or may 
not have received the notice of sale. This Court dictates the district court to find whether the HOA 
agents complied with NRS 116.31168 and NRS. 107.090(3) to determine if U.S. Bank did not 
receive timey notice by alternative means and suffered prejudice as a result. If so, the district court 
should consider whether, under NRS 107.080(2011), it should find the property sale void to protect 
the interests of U.S. Bank.8 The voiding of the sale would overcome a competing title even if it 
was a bona fide purchaser for value.  
 
The Court expresses that, even if the sale was not void, it was voidable. Due to the low sale 
price, noticed deficiencies, and other irregularities that establish that the transaction was affected 
by some element of fraud, unfairness, or oppression.9These claims were given little evaluation 
because the district court’s erroneous determination on the statutorily complaint notice issue. 
However, the Court states that the irregularities that arose out of this claim present a classic rise 
for equitable relief under Shadow Canyon, Shadow Wood, and Golden.10 In addition, this oversight 
led to the lack of consideration of whether Resources Group’s principal, Haddad, knew or should 
have known about the defective notice. This, taken in conjunction with his testimony should have 
warranted more scrutiny by the courts in light of the potential for fraudulent activity. Thus, the 
Court vacated the district court’s findings that Resources Group occupied bona fide purchaser 
status. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Allowing the HOA’s lien foreclosure sale to stand would violate the statutory requirements 
to provide timely and adequate notice of foreclosure to the holder of a recorded first deed of trust. 
Additionally, this misapprehension affected the decision on whether Resources Group was a BFP 
because it made it unnecessary to consider if their principal knew about the sale irregularities.  The 
Court reversed the ruling of the district court, vacated the partial judgement in favor of the 
Resources Group that it was a bona fide purchaser, and remanded the case for further proceedings. 
 
8  See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 107.080 (2011). 
9  See Golden, 387 P.2d 989, 995 (1963). 
10  See Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2227 Shadow Canyon, 405 P.3d 641, 646 (2017); 
Shadow Wood Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. N.Y. Cmty. Bankcorp, Inc., 366 P.3d 1105, 1110 (2016); Golden, at 387 
P.2d 99, 995 (1963). 
